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CASENOTE: KILLING LIFE PARTNERS: WHY VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS CONSTITUTE SECURITIES 
– IN LIGHT OF THE SEC v. MUTUAL BENEFITS CORPORATION AND OTHER RECENT CASES 
EXPLICITLY REJECTING LIFE PARTNERS  
A. Introduction 
 
“A viatical settlement is a transaction in which a 
terminally or chronically ill insured (“viator”) sells the 
benefits of his life insurance policy to a third party in return 
for a lump–sum cash payment equal to a percentage of the 
policy’s face value.”1 Viatical settlement providers purchase 
the policies from individual viators and typically sell 
fractionalized interests in these policies to investors.2 The 
investor's profit is the difference between the single payment 
to the viator and the death benefit collected from the insurer, 
less transaction costs, premiums paid, and other administrative 
expenses.3 The rate of return is dependant upon the term of the 
investment, which is determined by the life expectancy 
evaluation made by the viatical company.  “If the viator lives 
beyond his life expectancy, the term of the investment is 
extended and the premiums must either be paid from new investor 
funds assigned to other policies or by additionally funds from 
the original investors.”4
2Largely in response to individuals becoming penniless after 
incurring huge medical bills while they stepped closer and 
closer to death’s door from affliction with the AIDS virus in 
the 1980s, many companies were formed that bought out life 
insurance policies from AIDS victims in return for a discounted 
present rate.  As beneficial5 as this practice may seem, the 
fraud and lack of regulation in this newly-formed industry 
virtually screamed for regulation.   
Despite the fact that the investment articles espoused by 
this new industry should have been regulated by the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Judge 
Ginsburg announced the majority opinion for the D.C. Circuit in 
S.E.C. v. Life Partners, declaring that viatical settlements 
were not securities and thus could not come under the purview of 
federal securities laws.   
In this explicit denial of S.E.C. control,6 the Life 
Partners court left the regulation of viatical settlements7 to 
state Blue Sky laws8 and common law fraud.  The fact that “the 
securities laws [are not] a broad federal remedy for all fraud”9
does not vest federal courts with the power to magically craft 
bright-line rules of law out of thin air in order to place 
investment articles that are properly deemed securities outside 
the SEC’s jurisdiction.10 
3This note contends that the Life Partners court was legally 
incorrect and the bright-line distinction announced actually 
encourages fraud, runs contrary to the purpose and spirit of the 
Securities Laws and the Howey test.11 Moreover, the repeated 
rejection of Life Partners by several state courts operates as 
persuasive authority that Life Partners does not work in 
application.12 Proponents of Life Partners argue that viatical 
settlements are not securities because profits derive 
predominantly from external forces, i.e., the death of the 
viator.13 However, in the case of viatical settlements, where 
the investors are dependent on the efforts of the promoters to 
locate, asses and negotiate a price for the value of life 
insurance policies, investors realization of a profits turn 
largely on the promoters efforts.14 Viewing this reality in 
light of the purpose and spirit of the securities law,15 it 
matters not whether such effort occurs before or after the 
investor has pledged capital.  While the death of the viator may 
be the event which triggers the investor to realize a profit, it 
is only one variable.16 
The most recent17 federal case to address this issue is 
S.E.C. v. Mutual Benefits,18 where Judge Moreno of the Southern 
District of Florida explicitly refused to apply Life Partners.  
Despite the fact that Judge Moreno’s opinion is written in 
painstakingly broad terms which could be applied to bring 
4countless investment articles which are not securities under the 
SEC’s jurisdiction, Mutual Benefits cries out for affirmance 
because the viaticals at question present the quintessential 
example of what a security is under the Howey test. 
Even if Life Partners is read narrowly for the proposition 
that some post-purchase managerial or entrepreneurial activities 
must be undertaken by the promoter for an investment article to 
come within the reach of the SEC’s jurisdiction,19 the viatical 
settlements in both Life Partners and Mutual Benefits should 
properly be classified as investment contracts, and thus, 
securities.  Moreover, the D.C. Circuit downplayed the 
importance of the pre-purchase functions performed by the 
promoter.20 The efforts of the promoter in evaluating the 
“insured’s medical condition, review[ing] his insurance policy, 
negotiate[ing] the purchase price, and prepar[ing] the legal 
documents” are (as casually noted by the D.C. Circuit) 
“undeniably essential to the overall success of the 
investment.”21 
A. What Is A “Security?”  
 
“First and foremost, the federal securities laws were 
drafted and have consistently been interpreted from the 
perspective that flexibility in the law’s applicability is 
5paramount.”22 The “fundamental purpose undergirding the 
Securities Acts is ‘to eliminate serious abuses in a largely 
unregulated securities market.’”23 Recognizing the “virtually 
limitless scope of human ingenuity, especially in the creation 
of ‘countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the 
use of money of others on the promise of profits,’”24 in order to 
achieve its goal of protecting investors, Congress “painted with 
a broad brush”25 in defining the scope of the market it regulated 
to “encompass virtually any instrument that might be sold as an 
investment.”26 
In light of the foregoing considerations of Congress’s 
intent, the Supreme Court crafted a strikingly broad definition 
of an “investment contract”27:
an investment for purposes of the Securities Act 
means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a 
person invests his money and is led to expect 
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter 
or a third party, it being immaterial whether the 
shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal 
certificates or by nominal interests in the 
physical assets employed in the enterprise.28 
In other words, Howey requires three elements: (1) an investment 
of money; (2) a common enterprise; and (3) leading the investor 
to expect profits solely from the efforts of a third party.29 
The scope of this note is limited to the third prong of Howey, 
the expectation of profits based on the efforts of others, which 
6was the prong that was disputed in both Life Partners and Mutual 
Benefits.30 
In SEC v. Edwards, the Supreme Court reiterated how the 
“touchstone” of an investment contract is “‘the presence of an 
investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable 
expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or 
managerial efforts of others.’”31 The Supreme Court has never 
departed from Howey’s affirmation that the definition of a 
“security” is a “flexible rather than static principle… [which] 
is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable 
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others 
on the promise of profited.”32 
II.  Viatical Settlements 
 
A.  An Introduction: SEC v. Life Partners33 
The promoter-defendant in Life Partners sold fractional 
interests in insurance policies to retail investors, who may 
invest as little as $650 and buy a minimum of 3% of the benefits 
of a given policy.34 In order to solicit customers, Life 
Partners used around 500 commissioned “licensees”, who received 
7around 10% of the purchase price after overhead cost was paid 
out.35 The promoter claimed to have annual revenues over $150 
million in 1994 alone.36 The D.C. Circuit found that the 
promoters performed “ultimately no” entrepreneurial or 
managerial post-purchase functions.37 
The promoters performed various “pre-purchase” functions: 
they evaluated the insured’s38 medical condition, review his or 
her insurance policy, negotiates the purchase price, and 
prepares any necessary legal documents.39 After the transaction 
closed, an independent escrow agent acting for the promoter 
performed the “post-purchase administrative functions.”40 When 
the purchase of the fractional interest in the life insurance 
policy closed, the escrow agent collected its own fee as well as 
the promoters, and escrowed the funds for the premium payments 
and delivered the balance to the seller.41 Subsequently, the 
escrow agent held the policy and disbursed the funds, followed 
through with the paperwork and filed the death claim.42 From the 
preceding facts, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the promoter 
had “no continuing economic interest in the transaction after 
receipt of its fee upon the sale to the investor.”43 Largely 
considering the fact that the promoters in Life Partners 
represented that they performed no “significant efforts” after 
the closing of the transaction, the D.C. Circuit allowed them to 
avoid the federal securities laws.44 
8Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme Court 
has consistently held that federal securities laws need to be 
defined by “flexible”, rather than “static” principles, the D.C. 
Circuit, in Life Partners45 announced a bright-line rule of law 
that pre-purchase “efforts of other”, without more, are never 
enough to satisfy the third prong of Howey,46 even if the article 
possesses all the characteristics of an “investment contract” 
required by Howey.  Life Partners denied that pre-purchase 
activities could “suffice to make the profits of an investment 
arise predominantly from the efforts of others”47 because, once 
the transaction closes, the “only variable affecting profits is 
the timing of the insured’s death,”48 which is outside the 
promoter’s control.  In other words, the key temporal event in 
disqualifying an investment article as a security is the closing 
of the transaction.   
Thus, the D.C. Circuit concluded, regardless of how 
significant the pre-purchase entrepreneurial or managerial 
efforts of the promoters is, if there is no post-closing 
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts, no security has been 
sold. This bright-line rule of law is the type that runs 
entirely contrary to the flexible approach required by Howey.  
The pre/post49 investment distinction places an improper 
impediment on defining what a security is because it exalts 
“form over substance” and ignores the economic reality that the 
9investment articles in question, viaticals, meet all the 
requisite elements of what a security is.50 Moreover, Mutual 
Benefits, (hereinafter “MBC”) a company structured exactly the 
same as Life Partners, carried out enough post-purchase 
activities to classify the viaticals as securities.51 
B. Mutual Benefits 
 
i. Generally 
In SEC v. Mutual Benefits,52 MBC’s business was funded by 
investors whose capital was used and were promised a rate of 
return on such investment.53 “Investors were asked to identify a 
desired maturity date and submit a purchase agreement.”54 MBC
promised a range of rates of return, which was “dependent upon 
the term of the investment, which was determined by the life 
expectancy valuation.”55 Thus, if the viator lived beyond her or 
his expectancy, as evaluated by the viatical company56 in 
assessing the value of policies, the investor would receive a 
lesser amount of return on her of his investment than expected.  
Or, in the alternative, “[i]f the viator lives beyond his life 
expectancy, the term of the investment is extended and the 
premiums must either be paid from new investors funds assigned 
to other policies or by additional funds from the original 
investors.”57 
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Quite notably, MBC was structured virtually the same as 
Life Partners.58 In fact, after Life Partners was handed down, 
MBC was advised by its’ lawyers that viatical settlements were 
not securities and thus it was not required to follow federal 
securities law.59 Based on this advice, MBC structured the 
business plan of MBC so that it accorded with applicable law.”60 
Indeed, the bright-line rule enunciated in Life 
Partners created a loophole, which became the 
Defendants’ corporate structure model.  Anthony 
Livoti, trustee for MBC, testified in his 
deposition that the “attorneys of Mutual Benefits 
were cognizant of the SEC v. Life Partners case.”  
Indeed counsel for MBC, Michael McNerney, 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that MBC 
attempted to restructure certain portions of 
their operations to conform to the D.C. Circuit’s 
ruling in Life Partners.61 
Thus, MBC, a company providing securities, was able to avoid the 
disclosure and antifraud provisions of the federal securities 
laws based on the bright-line rule of law announced by Life 
Partners.  Does Life Partners then stand for the proposition 
that promoters of securities are free to evade the federal 
securities laws if they structure their businesses based on the 
nuances described in federal appellate court decisions?   The 
obvious answer to this query stands as direct evidence of why 
the securities laws must be flexible and why courts must avoid 
establishing bright-line rules of law.62 
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ii. Significant Post-Purchase Managerial Activities. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the “pre/post” investment 
distinction places an improper burden in bringing certain 
investment schemes under the purview of the federal securities 
laws, the promoters in Mutual Benefits performed significant 
post-purchase managerial and entrepreneurial activities to 
satisfy the distinction espoused in Life Partners.63 Assuming, 
arguendo, that the “pre/post” investment distinction is the 
proper one, the promoters in Mutual Benefits failed to contain 
their efforts to solely pre-investment, largely as a result of 
their own fraud.   
 Starting in 1997, MBC was experiencing persistent problems 
with life expectancies to viators of a majority of the policies 
it sold.64 When a MBC sales agent who represented hundreds of 
MBC investors complained to one of the majority owners (named 
Leslie Steinger) of MBC that the policies were not maturing 
within their life expectancies,65 he misrepresented that MBC was 
not experiencing and company-wide problems and it was a “‘fluke’ 
or ‘bad luck of the draw.’”66 Subsequently, the sales agents 
responded to investors with the same response.67 More
specifically, at the time the SEC commenced the action against 
MBC, “at least 93.5% and possibly as many as 94.2% of MBC’s AIDS 
policies have matured or will mature beyond their viator’s life 
12
expectancies, as calculated by MBC.”68 As for the non-AIDS 
policies, “an astounding 66.2% were beyond their life 
expectancies as of June 11, 2004.”69 
As a result of MBC’s doctors underestimating the life 
expectancies by 2.5 to 3.5 years, there were millions of dollars 
that were needed to pay the premiums on the policies that had 
not yet matured.70 Although MBC advised potential investors that 
it would “escrow funds sufficient to pay future premiums due 
under a given life insurance policy for a minimum of the 
projected life expectancy relied upon by MBC of the respective 
insured, or longer at MBC’s discretion”71, from 1995 until 1997 
MBC did not fund any premium escrow accounts to pay future 
premiums.72 As a result of MBC failing to “create escrow 
accounts for those policies, MBC paid premiums on those policies 
from its own operating accounts.  The funds for MBC’s operating 
accounts came almost exclusively from the amounts paid to MBC 
from each closing on the purchase of an interest in a viatical 
settlement by a new investor.”73 
It is here that MBC performed sufficient post-closing 
efforts to satisfy even Life Partners post-closing requirement.  
In other words, MBC’s revenue from a new viatical 
settlement contract funded the premium payments 
for the older insurance policies.  As of the date 
the SEC commenced this action, 1,227 of those 
more than 1,500 policies had not yet matured, and 
those 1,227 policies required annual premium 
payments of approximately $952,359.  Because 
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MBC’s only source of income is new investors 
funds, MBC’s inability to continue to make 
premium payments does, or eventually will, depend 
on MBC’s ability to bring in new investors.74 
Consequently, if MBC fails to bring in more investors in order 
to pay the premiums of the underestimated policies, then the 
policies will lapse and the investors will lose all their money.  
In light of this, it becomes abundantly clear that the profit of 
the investors depends predominately on the efforts of the 
promoters, thus satisfying the third prong of Howey.75 Clearly, 
the profits of the investors do depend “predominately on the 
efforts of the promoters.”76 These managerial and 
entrepreneurial efforts may even be deemed significant enough to 
satisfy the more stringent “efforts of others” requirement 
announced in Life Partners.77 
On the other hand, these efforts may not satisfy Life 
Partners, considering that Life Partners stated that “[t]he 
promoter’s ‘efforts’ not to engage in criminal or tortuous 
behavior, or not to breach its contract are not the sort of 
entrepreneurial exertions that the Howey court had in mind when 
it referred to profits arising from ‘the efforts of others.’”78 
Apparently the Life Partners court did not consider the 
consequences of certain propositions it asserted.  For example, 
what if such criminal or tortious behavior constitutes 
sufficient “efforts” to satisfy Howey’s third prong?  In Howey, 
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the Supreme Court stated that the “Securities Act prohibits the 
offer as well as the sale of unregistered, non-exempt 
securities.  Hence, it is enough that the respondents merely 
offer the essential ingredients of an investment contract.”79 
iii. Promoters Cannot Evade Federal Securities Laws By 
Representing Their Actions to Fail the Howey Test  
 
Consequently, the question becomes whether a promoter of a 
security can evade the federal securities laws by representing 
that his actions are not enough to satisfy the Howey test?  
Obviously not.  “The test if whether the scheme involves an 
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come 
solely from the efforts of others.  If that test be satisfied, 
it is immaterial whether the enterprise is speculative or non-
speculative or whether there is a sale of property with or 
without intrinsic value.”80 
This question presented in the preceding paragraph was 
indirectly addressed in an analogous situation in Albanese, 
where a group of investors sued an ice machine company which 
agreed to either manage or to lease back ice machines from the 
investors and place them in various institutions.81 
Consequently, the 11th Circuit reversed the district court’s 
finding that the contracts did not satisfy the third prong of 
15
Howey because the plaintiffs retained the potential for ultimate 
control over their investments, and held that, because the level 
of control that the investor maintained was insubstantial and 
illusory and allowed for no reasonable alternatives than relying 
on the promoter-ice machine company, the third prong of Howey 
was not disqualified, as a matter of law, and thus summary 
judgment was inappropriate.82 The court reasoned that, “[e]ven 
if the agreements’ words did grant the investors sufficient 
potential control over their ice machines to prevent the 
agreements from being securities, the record demonstrates that, 
in fact, any such control was illusory because plaintiffs had no 
realistic alternative to allowing PCI [the promoters] to manage 
their investments.”83 
Applying this reasoning to Mutual Benefits, it can be 
argued that even if the agreements did not place the success of 
the investment predominately in the promoters, their subsequent 
actions did, and thus the third prong of Howey can be satisfied. 
Moreover, the fundamental nature of this “Ponzi scheme”84 can 
constitute a security in and of itself.  Hence, the viatical 
settlements in Mutual Benefits were investment contracts and 
thus constitute securities under any reasonable analysis.85 
III. Why Life Partners is Incorrect and Must Not Be Followed 
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 The black-letter rule of law espoused in Life Partners was 
created out of thin air and finds no support in any Supreme 
Court precedent, statutory text or legislative history.86 In its 
endeavor to offer some precedent for the “pre/post purchase” 
distinction, the D.C. Circuit attempted to distinguish McCown v. 
Heidler,87 where the (D.C. Circuit claims) the Tenth Circuit 
applied the same “pre/post investment” principle to reach a 
different result with respect to an investment in undeveloped 
land.88 
In McCown, the investors claimed that, because the 
promoters had promised to make future improvements on the lots, 
the parcels marketed were securities.89 The Court found that 
“‘without the substantial improvements pledged by [the 
promoters] the lots would not have a value consistent with the 
price which purchasers paid....  The utilization of purchase 
money accumulated from lot sales to build the promised 
improvements could bring the scheme within the purview of the 
securities laws.” From this proposition, the court blindly 
concludes that  
In both Noa and McCown, the court of appeals regarded 
the promoter’s pre-purchase efforts as insignificant 
to the question whether the investments – in silver 
bars and parcels of land, respectively – were 
securities.  The different outcomes trace wholly to 
the promoters’ commitment to perform meaningful post-
purchase functions in McCown but not in Noa.90 
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The ultimate problem which this fallacy is that its first 
premise and conclusion are exactly the same: “pre-purchase 
efforts are never enough to satisfy the third prong of 
Howey”.  It runs contrary to any form of accepted logic to 
make this argument while recognizing that LPI’s91 pre-
purchase efforts were “undeniably essential the overall 
success of the investment…. [and] [t]he investors rely 
heavily, if not exclusively, upon LPI to locate insureds 
and to evaluate them and their policies, as well as to 
negotiate an attractive purchase price.”92 
The Life Partners court failed to discover any persuasive 
precedent to support the “pre/post” investment distinction in 
McCown, so it was forced to “rely” on Noa v. Key Futures93,
which involved investments in silver bars, the 
court observed that the promoter made pre-
purchase efforts to identify the investment and 
to locate prospective investors; offered to store 
the silver bars at no charge for a year after 
purchase and to repurchase them at the published 
spot price at any time without charging a 
brokerage fee.  The court concluded, however, 
that these services were only minimally related 
to the profitability of the investment: “Once the 
purchase … was made, the profits to the investor 
depended upon the fluctuations of the silver 
market, not the managerial efforts of [the 
promoter].”94 
However, the method of purchasing and selling silver bars, as 
illustrated in Noa, is entirely distinguishable from the 
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purchase and sale of fractional interests in life insurance 
policies.   
Noa stands for the proposition that some post-purchase 
managerial or entrepreneurial efforts must be performed by the 
promoter for a transaction to be classified as a security.  
HOWEVER, this proposition is properly limited to situations 
where the value of the investment is left entirely to external 
forces outside the control of the promoter. In the case of 
viatical settlements, the expertise of the promoter in assessing 
the policy pre-investment largely dictates the profitability of 
the investor.  Whereas investing in silver or other similar 
“products”, the established commodities market dictates the 
value, of which the promoter has no control.  The reason why 
this distinction is proper is because “when profits depend on 
the intervention of market forces, there will be public 
information available to an investor by which the investor could 
assess the likelihood of the investment’s success.95 For  
example, 
a purchaser of silver bars has access to 
information on the trends in silver prices, an 
investor in paintings can get a sense, at least 
generally, of how the market for artwork is 
faring, and a purchaser of an undeveloped lot has 
access to information on growth trends in the 
area.  Obviously, the degree to which this 
information is actually available to an investor 
depends on the sophistication and education of an 
investor, but that is true about investments 
generally.  Moreover, where profits depend on the 
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operation of market forces “registration … could 
provide no data about the seller which would be 
relevant those market risks.” 
 
In light of the preceding, Judge Wald correctly opined as to the 
proper distinction,  
that the third prong of the Howey test can be met by 
pre-purchase managerial activities of the promoter 
when it is the success of the success of these 
activities, either entirely or predominately, that 
determines whether profits are eventually realized.96 
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit failed to distinguish Noa on the 
grounds that the promoters performed neither pre nor post 
purchase entrepreneurial efforts97, and had no control over the 
investment whatsoever. Rather, the investors ultimately decided 
when to sell their interest, with a mere option to sell to the 
promoters.  The only similarity between the scheme in Noa and 
Life Partners is that the time of sale dictated the 
profitability of the investment.  However, the investors in 
viatical settlements rely on the expertise of the promoters in 
procuring and evaluating the policies, including the physician’s 
review of the insured’s life expectancy and the promoters’ 
representations regarding the accuracy of such expectancies.98 
“The profitability of investments in these viatical settlements 
is wholly determined by the efforts of the promoters in 
evaluating life expectancies.”99 All the investor can do is pay 
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his money and “trust” that the promoters’ effort was sufficient 
to guarantee him or her a decent return.100 
“Once the purchase of silver bars was made, the profits of 
the investor depended upon the fluctuations of the silver 
market, not the managerial efforts of Key Futures.”101 On the 
other hand, the investor’s profit deriving from viatical 
settlements is wholly dependant on the promoters’ evaluation of 
the viator’s life expectancy, not the time of the viator’s 
death,    
[p]rofits from investments in viatical 
settlements are determined by whether MBC’s life 
expectancy evaluation is correct.  Here, MBC 
located policies, evaluated viators’ life 
expectancies, bid on policies, negotiated the 
purchase price of policies.  The profitability of 
investments in these viatical settlements is 
wholly determined by the efforts of the promoters 
in evaluating life expectancies.  In investments 
in viatical settlements, the investor only 
chooses the desired term of investment, MBC 
matches the investors’ funds with viators’ policy 
whose life expectancies match the investors’ 
desired term of investment.  The longer the 
viator lives beyond his life expectancy, as 
evaluated by MBC, the lower the investors’ 
profits.  The investors plainly rely on MBC’s 
life expectancy evaluations.102 
In light of the preceding, the fact that Noa focuses on the 
post-purchase efforts of the promoter in determining whether a 
scheme is an investment contract does not prove dispositive in 
the case of viatical settlements.103 Rather, the “pre-post” 
investment distinction is only triggered when an investors’ 
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realization of profits is wholly dependant on external market 
forces of which the promoter is unable to exert control over.  
Even if “the timing of the viator’s death is of great 
consequence in the realization of investors’ profits”104 the 
profits from investments in viatical settlements are determined 
by whether the promoters’ life expectancy valuation is 
correct.105 “[T]he crucial inquiry [for the third prong] is the 
amount of control that the investors retain under their written 
agreements.”106 In light of this proposition, the “efforts of 
others” prong of Howey is satisfied because it is the 
“promoters’ efforts, not that of the investors, that form the 
‘essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or 
success of the enterprise.’”107 
It is crucial to recognize that the “efforts of others” 
prong of Howey largely considers the “expertise” that the 
promoter provides.108 In fact, the Noa court explicitly stated 
that the fact pattern it addressed was not analogous to Glen-
Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino109, where promoters 
“provided their expertise.”110 In the alternative, the promoters 
in Noa neither offered their expertise nor “controlled” the 
investors’ realization of a profit; all they did was offer 
storage and assured that they would buy back the silver.  
Moreover, there is no case111 that holds “that pre-purchase 
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activities alone cannot satisfy Howey’s third prong.”112 
Accordingly, it can rationally be said that Noa is nothing like 
Life Partners.   
In consideration of the preceding, the pre/post investment 
distinction, of which viatical settlements promoters wholly rely 
on to avoid the SEC’s scrupulous disclosure and antifraud 
provisions, is derived from a case which is not analogous to the 
sale of fractional interests in life insurance policies.  In 
other words, the D.C. Circuit capriciously allows promoters of a 
certain type of investment contract to side-step government 
regulation that is aimed at protecting investors simply because 
they represent to investors that all their efforts occur before 
the investor pledges his or her money.   
It is necessary to question whether Judge Ginsburg pondered 
the countless instances that this hapless distinction could be 
used to evade federal securities laws.  Perhaps he did not, 
considering that Judge Ginsburg declared that the time of sale 
is not an artificial dividing line.113 
It is a legal construct but a significant one.  
If the investor’s profits depend thereafter 
predominantly upon the promoter’s efforts, then 
the investor may benefit from the disclosure and 
other requirements of the federal securities 
laws.  But if the value of the promoter’s efforts 
has already been impounded into the promoter’s 
fees or into the purchase price of the 
investment, and if neither the promoter nor 
anyone else is expected to make further efforts 
that will affect the outcome of the investment, 
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then the need for federal securities regulation 
is greatly diminished.114 
The preceding proposition fails to assert why the need for 
regulation is greatly diminished when the investor’s profits 
depend on pre-investment efforts.  Consequently, Judge 
Ginsburg’s statement can be read to stand for the proposition 
that where the promoter’s efforts only occur pre-purchase, even 
if those efforts are undeniably “essential managerial efforts 
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise”115, the
philosophy is one of caveat emptor.116 Such a proposition 
permits promoters to decide, sua sponte,117 whether their 
investment scheme will be regulated by the SEC.  Obviously Judge 
Ginsburg did not intend to establish such treacherous 
precedent.118 
In light of the foregoing consideration, a further analysis 
reveals that the “pre/post” distinction in measuring “efforts of 
others” is wholly backwards and thus incorrect.  Rather, the 
need for disclosure to investors is actually heightened when all 
the promoters efforts occurs pre-purchase, because the investor 
is ultimately helpless in the control of his pledge of money.119 
If the promoter’s efforts are finished at the time the 
investment closes, then the return on the investment is entirely 
dependant on the promoter’s valuation of irrepressible outside 
forces, such as the insured’s death.  Thus, the need for 
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disclosure is heightened because once the investor pledges their 
money and it is placed on a policy, he or she is helpless 
because the investment is now set in stone and cannot be saved 
by any subsequent measure.120 However, if fractional interests 
in life insurance policies were properly deemed investment 
contracts, then the investor would get the more protective 
remedies under federal securities laws, such as recession of the 
purchase and other extraordinary remedies that are usually 
unavailable at common law.121 Considering this fact, it cannot 
rationally be said that the need for disclosure is reduced if 
the efforts occur pre-purchase.   
 Even if the need for disclosure is not amplified when the 
promoters’ effort occurs post-investment (as argued above), the 
time of sale is, contrary to Judge Ginsburg’s assertion122, an
artificial dividing line.  As stated in the preceding, the focus 
should be on the “degree of dependence between the investor’s 
profits and the promoter’s activities.”123 Stated differently, 
in determining whether the “efforts of others” prong of Howey is 
satisfied, the ultimate question is whether the investor’s 
profit would theoretically increase as a result of the 
promoter’s efforts, not on the time of which the promoter’s 
efforts occur.124 
Moreover, the antifraud and disclosure provisions of the 
federal securities laws were enacted to prevent investors from 
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being defrauded by the “countless and variable schemes devised 
by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise 
of profits”125 and to “restore the confidence of the prospective 
investor in his ability to select sound securities.”126 The
emphasis has never been on when the fraud occurred.  Rather, 
whenever an investor’s profits depend on the success of the 
promoter’s activities, “there is less access to protective 
information and the type of information that is needed is more 
specific to the promoter.”127 The need for disclosure is not 
magically diminished because the promoter’s efforts occurred 
before the investor pledged his or her money.  Even more, 
[g]iven the pivotal role of the promoter’s 
activities, what the investor needs to know is 
not generally how this type of activity has fared 
but what the specific risk factors attached to 
the investment are and whether there is any 
reason why the investor should be leery of the 
promoter’s promises.  This need for information 
holds true in regard to investors prior to 
purchase as much as to investors who have 
committed their funds – indeed, more so, if they 
are to avoid over-risk investments.128 
Thus, the temporal distinction is, contrary to Judge Ginsburg’s 
assertion, an artificial dividing line.  
 
A. Potential Counter-Arguments  
OR, on the other hand, it can be argued that the focus on 
post-purchase activities, as espoused in Life Partners (as 
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discussed throughout this note), is the appropriate distinction 
in furthering the purpose of securities laws.  The argument 
starts with the proposition that “‘the securities laws [are not] 
a broad federal remedy for all fraud.”129 From this, it is 
contended that an investor has a superior ability to evaluate 
and assess the efforts undertaken by a promoter before he 
invests his money, as opposed to a promoter’s promises about 
what will happen in the future to generate profits.130 Thus, the 
need for SEC regulation and disclosure is lessened.  This 
argument seems perfectly rational; however, it falls short of 
explaining why the time of the promoter’s efforts matters.  
Ultimately, as evidenced above, it is revealed to be based on a 
faulty logic.     
In fact, if the securities laws are meant to protect 
against the risk involved in trusting someone else to make a 
profit with your money, in other words, an investor who “seeks 
the use of they money of others on the promise of profits”131,
then the need to SEC regulation should apply with equal force 
whether the effort occurs before or after an investor pledges 
her money.132 Moreover, contrary to some legal scholar’s 
arguments, viatical settlements do meet the requirements of what 
a security is, both in substance and form, to fall under the 
SEC’s jurisdiction.133 
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Moreover, promoters of viatical settlements are not exactly 
“innocent” middle men whose efforts are significant in 
generating profits.  Purchasers in viatical settlements are 
“attracted by representations of investment income”134 and the 
promoter’s purpose is to raise money “to finance substantial 
investments.”135 They are not, contrary to Glick’s argument, 
merely matching investors in viatical settlements with 
viators.136 As evidenced above, the promoter’s efforts dictate 
the profits of the investor. 
 
IV. Cases Rejecting Life Partners 
 In light of the preceding, it should come of no surprise 
that Life Partners has been repeatedly rejected since it was 
handed down. 
 
A. Federal Cases 
 In Wuliger v. Christie137, the court agreed with Judge 
Wald’s dissent in Life Partners that “insisting that some 
activity must occur after purchase but allowing any activity, no 
matter how trivial, to satisfy this requirement violates the 
principle that form should not be elevated over substance and 
economic reality.”138 The court ultimately refused to apply 
Life Partners, finding it unpersuasive.”139 
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 Two years before Wuliger, a viatical investment program was 
found to be a security in S.E.C. v. Tyler.140 In addressing 
whether the scheme in question was a security, the court in 
Tyler “focused on the promoters representations to the investors 
in conjunction with the Supreme court’s directive in giving a 
broad definition to a security coupled with ‘Congress’ purpose 
in enacting the securities laws to regulate investment, in 
whatever form they are made and by whatever name they are 
called.”141 
B. State Cases 
 There have been several state court cases that have 
rejected the Life Partners “pre/post” purchase distinction in 
analyzing whether viaticals are securities under state blue sky 
laws.142 Recently, an Indiana appellate court in Accelerated 
Benefits Co. v. Peaslee143 rejected Life Partners because it 
found that the “profits the investors expect to realize depends 
almost entirely upon the purchaser’s expertise in choosing which 
life insurance policies to purchase.  More specifically, the 
investors rely upon the purchaser’s ability to estimate the life 
expectancy of each prospective viator by obtaining expert 
medical evaluations … [and] to determine the actual death 
benefits, ensure the policy is not contestable on any grounds, 
and ensure that the policy is assignable.”144 
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In concluding that a viatical settlements constitute 
investment contracts, the Indiana court found support in Poyser 
v. Flora145, Security Trust Corp. v. Estate of Fisher146, and
Siporin v. Carrington147. The repeated rejection of Life 
Partners lends more than strong support for the proposition that 
Life Partners was wrongly decided.148 
For further rejection of Life Partners, look no further 
than: Rumbaugh v. Ohio Department of Commerce149, Michelson v. 
Voison150, and Joseph v. Viatical Management, LLC.151 In sum,
viatical settlements are investment contracts and thus 
securities and must be regulated under the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.   
 
V. Conclusion 
 In light of all the foregoing factors, the viatical 
settlements offered and sold in Mutual Benefits152 must be found 
to be investment contracts and thus securities, as defined by 
the Supreme Court in SEC v. WJ Howey153. Moreover, even if the 
Eleventh Circuit154 declines to issue an opinion contrary to Life 
Partners, it should still conclude that the promoters of the 
viatical settlements performed sufficient post-closing 
managerial and entrepreneurial efforts to satisfy the third 
prong of Howey, even under the more stringent test announced in 
Life Partners.  Upon the possibility that Life Partners was 
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legally correct at the time it was decided, experience has 
proved the contrary, because the promoters of the sale of 
fractional interests in life insurance policies routinely engage 
in sufficient efforts to conclude that the investors profits 
depended predominately on the efforts of the promoter.155 
Moreover, it runs contrary to the federal securities laws as 
well as logic to follow a legal doctrine that stands for the 
proposition that, where the promoter’s efforts only occur pre-
purchase, even if those efforts are undeniably “essential 
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the 
enterprise”156, the philosophy is one of caveat emptor.157 
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1 S.E.C.  v. Mutual Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp 2d 1337, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2004) 
(citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1377 (7th Ed. 1999) . The amount that viatical 
companies claim to pay viators varies in each case.  In S.E.C.  v. Life 
Partners, 87 F. 3d 536,537 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the company claimed to pay 20%-
40% of face value of the policy.  The viatical company called the “Life 
Settlement Guide” promised to pay the policy owner 30%-80% of the full face 
value of the policy. 
(available at www.lifesettlementsguide.com/life_settlements_info) Last 
visited 10/21/2004 at 16:22.  Contra, see fn. 132: Glick, ARE VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS 
SECURITIES WITHIN THE REGULATORY CONTROL OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933? 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
957 (1993).  
 
2 Id. at 1338.   
 
3 Life Partners, 87 F. 3d 536, 537. 
 
4 Mutual Benefits at 1338.  Here, as is common in many viatical settlements, 
when the viator lives longer than expected, then the viatical company must 
keep paying premiums on the policy and the investor’s profit is either 
diminished or eliminated.  Then, the viatical company will either (i) not pay 
the investor or (ii) use another investor’s funds to pay the original 
investor.  See generally,  VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS: AN EXPLANATION OF THE PROCESS, AN 
ANALYSIS OF STATE REGULATIONS, AND AN EXAMINATION OF VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS AS SECURITIES, 46 
Drake L. Rev. 923. (1998).   
 
5 Depending on the reader’s view, perhaps as “‘ghoulish’ as this investment 
vehicle sounds, it actually allows a terminally ill person in the later 
stages of a disease, to obtain additional funds with which to secure either 
the basis means of support or additional comforts during the insured’s final 
days.”  In re Mcguire, 284 B.R. 481, 485 (Bkrtcy. D. Colo. 2002) (where a 
creditor who invested in viatical settlements offered by a bankruptcy debtor 
without knowing that the company whose viaticals it allegedly purchased was 
engaged in Ponzi scheme unsuccessfully sued to except resulting debt from 
discharge in bankruptcy case).   
 
6 This denial also dictated a denial of federal court jurisdiction.  
 
7 This note uses the term “viatical” settlement and “life” settlement 
interchangeably.  “The only distinction between life settlements and viatical 
settlements is that in life settlements, the insured is not terminally or 
chronically ill.”  Mutual Benefits Co. at 1338.   
 
8 “The term appears to have originated from the speculative schemes that these 
early laws intended to prevent that ‘had no more basis that so many feet of 
blue sky’”.  Mutual Benefits Corp. at 1341, fn 6.  (citing State v. Gopher 
Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920).) 
 
9 Life Partners at 547.  (quoting Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 
(1982). 
 
10 Mutual Benefits at 1342.  Judge Moreno noted that “[b]right-line rules are 
discouraged in the context of federal securities laws for the reason that 
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they tend to created loopholes that can be used by the clever and dishonest.” 
Id. 
11 In S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-299 (1946), the Supreme 
Court crafted an expansive definition of “investment contract,” (and all 
investment contracts are securities, unless explicitly exempt), “…an 
investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, 
transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common 
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely form the efforts of the 
promoter of a third party…”.   The Courts have interpreted the Howey test to 
comprise the following three elements: (1) an investment of money; (2) a 
common enterprise; and (3) the expectation of profits derived solely form the 
efforts of others.  Mutual Benefits Co. at 1341.  In Howey, 328 U.S. 294, the 
promoter offered individual staying at the “Howey in the Hills” resort a land 
a service contract regarding its citrus acreage in Florida.  The court found 
it to be immaterial  
 
that some purchasers choose not to accept the full offer of an investment 
contract by declining to enter into a service contract with the respondents.  
The Securities Act prohibits the offer as well as the sale of unregistered, 
non-exempt securities.  Hence, it is enough that the respondents merely offer 
the essential ingredients of an investment contract. 
 
Id. at 301. 
 
12 See e.g., infra, p.__    See Accelerated Benefits Co. v. Peaslee, 818 N.E. 
2d. 73 (Ind. App. 2004); Rumbaugh v. Ohio Department of Commerce, 800 N.E. 2d 
780 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003); Plyser v. Flora, 780 N.E. 2d 1191 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2003); Michelson v. Voison, 658 N.W. 2d 188 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003); Joseph v. 
Viatical management, LLC, 55 P. 3d 264; and Sipornin v. Carrington, 23 P. 3d 
92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).   
 
13 See generally, Life Partners at 536; Glick, 46 Drake L. Rev. 923.   
 
14 Mutual Benefits at 1342. See e.g., Wuliger v. Christie, 310 F. Supp. 2d 897 
(N.D. Ohio 2004), noting that “[w]hile the decision in Life Partners [sic] is 
characterized as having been largely unchallenged, it is perhaps a more 
accurate assessment to state that it has not altogether been embraced by 
other circuits and continues to generate much discussion in the academic 
realm.” Id. at 904.   
 
15 “Enacted in the early 1930’s, the federal securities laws came in direct 
response to the stock market crash of late 1929 and the resulting depression 
that forged a political consensus in Congress to regulate securities.  As 
noted by the Supreme Court, ‘[i]t requires little appreciation … of what 
happened in this country during the 1920’s and 1930’s to realize how 
essential it is that the highest ethical standards prevail’ in every facet of 
the securities industry.” Mutual Benefits at 1339. (internal citations 
omitted).   
 
16 Id. at 1342.   
 
17 At least two other district courts have held that viatical settlements 
constitute “securities.”  Wuliger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 897 is factually similar 
to Mutual Benefits, S.E.C. v. Tyler, 2002 WL 32538418 (N.D. Tex 2002) is 
factually different, but quite relevant.  In Tyler,
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the promoters enticed elderly investors by touting the investment’s 
liquidity, a fixed interest rate, specific maturity date and maturity value 
at the outset of the investment.  The promoter then took the investors’ money 
and purchased fractional shares of viatical investments which had none of the 
attributes represented to the investor.  In considering whether these 
investments constituted securities, the district court focused on the 
promoters representations to the investors in conjunction with the Supreme 
Court’s directive in giving a broad definition to a security coupled with 
“Congress’ purpose in enacting the securities laws to regulate investments, 
in whatever form they are made and by whatever name they are called.”   
 
Wuliger v. Christie, 310 F. Supp. 2d 897, 904. (quoting Reves v. Ernst & 
Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990). 
 
18 Mutual Benefits at 1337.  
 
19 The fact that Life Partners was often inaccurate in evaluating a viator’s 
life expectancy required them to execute significant managerial and 
entrepreneurial efforts, post-investment.  See infra, p. 18 
 
20 See also, Life Partners at 551, fn. 1 (Wald, J., dissenting), arguing that 
the promoter’s promise to assist in the “resale of policies combined with its 
emphasis on the availability of resale activities to constitute a managerial 
post-purchase activity.     
21 Life Partners at 547, also noting how “[t]he investors rely heavily, if not 
exclusively, upon LPI to locate insureds and to evaluate them and their 
policies, as well as to negotiate an attractive purchase price.    
 
22 Mutual Benefits at 1339.   
 
23Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60 (quoting United Housing Foundation, 
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975).   
 
24 Id. at  60-61 (quoting Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 299).   
25 Id. at 60.   
 
26 Id. at 61.  
 
27 “Section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)(1), and § 3(a)(10) of 
the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10), in slightly different formulations 
which we have treated as essentially identical in meaning…define ‘security’ 
to include ‘any note, stock, treasury bond, debenture…investment contract…[or 
any] instrument commonly known as a ‘security’….‘[i]nvestment contract’  is 
not itself defined.” SEC v. Edwards, 124 S. Ct. 892, 896 (2004) (quoting 
Reves at 61, n. 1, 110 S. Ct. 945).  In interpreting what fell under the 
category of “investment contract”,  
 
[f]orm was disregarded for substance and emphasis was placed upon economic 
reality.  An investment contract thus came to mean a contract or scheme for 
“the placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure 
income or profit from its employment.”  
 
Howey at 298.   
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28 Howey  at 298-299. 
 
29 Albanese v. Florida Nat’l Bank of Orlando, 823 F. 2d 408, 410 (11th Cir. 
1987).   In Albanese, where a group of investors sued a ice machine company 
which agreed to either manage or to lease back ice machines from the 
investors and place them in various institutions, the 11th Circuit reversed 
the district court’s finding that the contracts did not satisfy the third 
prong of Howey because the plaintiffs retained the potential for ultimate 
control over their investments, and held that, because the level of control 
that the investor maintained was insubstantial and illusory and allowed for 
no reasonable alternatives than relying on the promoter-ice machine company, 
the third prong of Howey was not disqualified, as a matter of law, and thus 
summary judgment was inappropriate.   Id. (“Even if the agreements’ words 
did grant the investors sufficient potential control over their ice machines 
to prevent the agreements from being securities, the record demonstrates 
that, in fact, any such control was illusory because plaintiffs had no 
realistic alternative to allowing PCI [the promoters] to manage their 
investments.”  Id. at 412)  
 
30 The requirement that profits come “solely” from the efforts of others was 
later relaxed.  See Mutual Benefits at 1342; SEC v. Int’l Loan Network, Inc.,
968 F. 2d 1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (commenting that investors expect 
profits to result “if not solely, at least predominantly” from the efforts of 
the promoter); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc.  474 F. 2d 476, 482 (9th 
Cir. 1973), where the court held that the question is whether “the efforts 
made by those other than the investor are undeniably significant ones, those 
essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the 
enterprise.”  SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F. 2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 
1974). 
 
31 Edwards, 124 S. Ct. at 897-898.  In Edwards, the Supreme Court duly noted 
that “[t]he fact that investors have bargained for a return on their 
investment does not mean that the return is not also expected to come solely 
from the efforts of others.  Any other conclusion would conflict with our 
holding that an investment contract was offered in Howey itself.”  Id. at 
898. 
 
32 Howey at 299.  See also Edwards at 897-898. 
 
33 The overview of viatical settlements is provided in the introduction, 
supra. 
34 Life Partners at 539.   
 
35 Id. 
 
36 Id. “[I]n 1994 the company accounted for more than half of the industry’s 
estimated annual revenues of $300 million.” 
 
37 Id. at 539-540.  The promoter could appear,  
 
and continued to appear after the investors had purchased their interests, in 
an insurance company’s records as the owners of a policy; LPI insists, 
however that this practice was adopted not because LPI had any continuing 
entrepreneurial role to play but only at the urging of the insurance 
companies for their administrative convenience; the investor was at all times 
35
 
the legal owner … once an investor acquired an interest in a policy he could 
avail himself of LPI’s on-going administrative services, which included 
monitoring the insured’s health, assuring that the policy did not lapse, 
converting a group policy into an individual policy where required, and 
arranging where required, and arranging for resale of the investor’s interest 
when so required and feasible. 
Id.   If it can be said that the investor would not make a profit if these 
activities were not performed, then how does the profitability of the 
investment depend solely on the death of the viator?  Is this factual 
situation not similar to Howey?  Can it not be reasonably argued that if the 
profitability of the investment depends entirely on the death of the viator 
here, then why wouldn’t the profitability of the investment in Howey depend 
entirely on how good of a citrus season occurred?  Moreover, Howey explicitly 
rejected the argument that the “fact that some purchasers choose not to 
accept the full offer of an investment contract by declining to enter into a 
service contract … it is enough that the respondents merely offer the 
essential ingredients of an investment contract.”  Howey at 1102.   
 
38 In other words, the person who was selling the benefits of their life 
insurance policy, called a “viator”. 
 
39 Id. at 539 
 
40 Id  at 540. 
 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
 
43 Id. 
 
44 After the D.C. Circuit’s opinion was issued, the promoters in Mutual 
Benefits, discussed infra, structured their scheme exactly like the promoters 
in Life Partners. 
 
45 SEC. v. Life Partners, 87 F. 3d 536, 537 
 
46 Id. at 540.   
 
47 Id. at 547.  
 
48 Id. at 545. 
 
49 “MBC located the policies to purchase, negotiated purchase prices, bid on 
policies, obtained life expectancy evaluations of individual viators, and 
created the legal documents need to conclude the transaction.  In order to 
sell the viatical settlements, MBC solicited investors both directly and 
through sales agents.”  See SEC v. Mutual Benefits,  2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23008 at 4 (S. D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2004) Dkt. No. 529 (Judge Garber’s “Report 
and Recommendation”  
 
50 Howey stated in painstakingly unambiguous terms that in determining what an 
“investment contract” is, form should be disregarded for substance and 
emphasis should be placed upon the economic reality.  Howey at 1102.    
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51 Mutual Benefits, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23008 at 42. See also, Mutual 
Benefits at 1340, “the Supreme Court has consistently repeated the 
interpretive principle that courts should determine the contours of the term 
‘security’ from the posture that substance should be elevated over form, with 
a special sensitivity to the economic reality of the transaction, not its 
formal characteristics.” (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 
(1967)).   
 
52 Supra, note 1.  
 
53 Mutual Benefits, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23008 
54 Mutual Benefits at 1338.   
 
55 Id.  
 
56 The viatical company in Mutual Benefits hired doctors to write letters 
which represented that they had “spoken to or consulted with the viator’s 
treating physicians, which was not true.” Id. at 18.  Regardless of whether 
the promoters (Mutual Benefits) were actually carrying out pre-purchase 
activities to determine the success of the investment, they represented that 
they were, and thus carried out extensive pre-purchase activities.  Moreover, 
Mutual Benefits (hereinafter “MBC”) routinely lied to investors regarding the 
possibility that the viators would live beyond their life expectancy, which 
would diminish the return on their investment.  “‘[i]t was kind of a standing 
banter in the [MBC] office, that these people were going to live a lot longer 
than three years and yet no HIV, AIDS file was ever placed a longer life 
expectancy than three years.” Mutual Benefits, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23008 at 
20.   
 
57 Mutual Benefits at 1338.  See supra note 4.   
 
58 Id. at 1343. 
 
59 Mutual Benefits, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23008 at 42. 
 
60 Id.  In other words, based on the Life Partners’ court “pre/post “ purchase 
distinction,  MBC structured their company identical to Life Partners 
business structure.   
 
61 Id. at 1343 
 
62 See generally, Mutual Benefits at 1337.; Wuliger at 904.  
63 See generally, Mutual Benefits, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23008 
64 Id. at 35-36.   
 
65 To reiterate, the longer a viator lived, the less profit the investor 
received. 
 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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68 Id. at 33-35.  In fact, MBC completely stopped selling the AIDS policies in 
1993.  Additionally, “MBC did not advise new investors about the effects 
which new medical treatments were having on the viatical settlement industry 
and, particularly, on the policies MBC sold.  To the contrary, in the late 
1990’s, MBC addressed investors’ concerns about new AIDS treatments by 
informing them that the treatments did not work for all individuals.”  Id. at 
34-35.   
 
69 Id. at 38.   
 
70 Id. at 41.  The court identified that there had been an underestimation of 
life expectancies for non-AIDS polices by 2.5 to 3.5 years.   
 
71 Id. at 41. 
 
72 Id. at 42 
 
73 Id. at 42. 
 
74 Id. at 42-43. 
 
75 Howey at 298-299. 
 
76 Infra, fn 26.   
 
77 Life Partners at 545.   
 
78 Id. 
79 Howey at 301.  “The registration requirements of s 5 refer to sales of 
securities.  Section 2(3) defines “sale” to include every ‘attempt or offer 
to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy,’ a security for value.”  
Id., FN6.   
 
80 Howey at 301.  (emphasis added).   
 
81 Albanese v. Florida Nat’l Bank of Orlando, 823 F. 2d 408, 410. 
 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
 
84 This process of using additionally investors to pay out original investors 
without any realized profits is a form of “Ponzi scheme” and usually falls 
under common law fraud.  Although the term “Ponzi scheme” is “generally used 
to describe an investment scheme which is not really supported by any 
underlying business venture,” the viatical companies way of attracting 
investors with high rate of returns is quite analogous:  
 
The investors are paid profits from the principal sums paid in by newly 
attracted investors. Usually those who invest in the scheme are promised 
large returns on their principal investments. The initial investors are 
indeed paid the sizable promised returns. This attracts additional investors. 
More and more investors need to be attracted into the scheme so that the 
growing number of investors on top can get paid. The person who runs this 
scheme typically uses some of the money invested for personal use. Usually 
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this pyramid collapses and most investors not only do not get paid their 
profits, but also lose their principal investments.  
 
In Re Randy, 189 B.R. 425, 437 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ill., 1995); see also  In re 
Mcguire, 284 B.R. 481, 485 
 
However, a more in-depth analysis of a “Ponzi scheme” is beyond the scope of 
this note.  
 
85 In other words, the 11th Circuit could affirm the lower courts finding 
without conflicting (or over-ruling if the Supreme Court grants 
certiorari)with Life Partners. 
 
86 Mutual Benefits at 1343. 
 
87 527 F. 2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975) 
 
88 Life Partners at 547.  
 
89 527 F. 2d 204. 
 
90 Life Partners at 547.   
 
91 LPI was the promoter-defendant in Life Partners. 
92 Id. at 547.   
 
93 638 F. 2d 77 (9th Cir. 1980).  
 
94 Life Partners at 546.   
 
95 Life Partners at 552. (Wald, J., dissenting). 
 
96 Id. at 551.  
 
97 The D.C. Circuit failed to make this crucial distinction.   
 
98 Mutual Benefits at 1342.   
 
99 Id.  
100 Noa is also distinguishable because the scheme it addressed failed the 
second prong of Howey because there was no common enterprise.   
 
101 Noa at 79.   
 
102 Mutual Benefits at 1342.   
 
103 Contra, Id. at 1343, where Judge Moreno stated that a “fair reading of Noa 
reveals no such distinction between pre and post-purchase activities.”  
 
104 Id. at 1342. 
 
105 Id. 
106 S.E.C. v. Unique Financial Concepts, 196 F. 3d 1195, 1201 (11th Cir. 1999),  
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citing Albanese at 410; fn 29.  
 
107 Mutual Benefits at 1342. (citing Unique Financial Concepts, 196 F. 3d 1195, 
where the 11th Circuit found the purported offer of the sale of foreign 
currency options to be securities because (1) the investors retained no 
control over their investments, since their were no actual investments to 
control, and (2) the customer agreement gave the promoters the sole 
discretion to use the total funds deposited by the investors.  Unique 
Financial Concepts 196 F. 3d 1195, 1201. (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
See also, Albanese at 410, infra 
108 See Noa at 80. (discussing Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 
F. 2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 
109 493 F. 2d 1027.  
 
110 Noa at 80.  
 
111 At a minimum, when Life Partners was decided, there was no case that held 
that pre-purchase activities alone failed the third prong of Howey. 
112 Life Partners at 553. (Wald, J., dissenting)  
 
113 Id. at 547.   
 
114 Life Partners at 547.  
 
115 Life Partners at 547, and 550 (Wald, J., dissenting)  See also: SEC v. 
Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc.  474 F. 2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 
116 “[a] fundamental purpose, common to [the securities laws], was to 
substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat 
emptor.” Life Partner at 550 (Wald, J., dissenting) (quoting LOUIS LOSS & JOEL 
SELIGMAN, 1 SECURITIES REGULATION 171-94, 391-94 (3d ed. 1989)(describing the 
disclosure philosophy of the securities laws).   
 
117 See discussion of Mutual Benefits at p.___ 
 
118 See generally, Id. at 1343.   
 
119 This is especially true in the case of viatical settlements because of the 
lack of an established secondary market that an investor can access.  
 
120 See Plaintiff’s Amicus Brief for Scheck Investments. 
121 See generally, Rowe v. Maremont Corp., 850 F. 2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1988), for 
example,  see _____ 
[t]he Supreme Court had broadly stated that in Rule 10b-5 cases involving 
defrauded sellers, “the correct measure of damages … is the difference 
between the fair value of all the … seller received and the fair value of 
what he would have received had there been no fraudulent conduct, except for 
the situation where the defendant received more than the seller’s actual 
loss.  In the latter case damages are the amount of the defendant’s profit.” 
 
Id. quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. U.S., 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
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122 See Life Partners at 547, where Judge Ginsburg declared that the time of 
sale is not an artificial dividing line. 
 
123 Id. at 552. (Wald, J., dissenting). 
 
124 Wuliger at 906.   
 
125 Howey at 299.  See also, Life Partners at 551, (Wald, J., dissenting).  
Judge Wald was troubled by the majority’s approach because it “undercuts the 
flexibility and ability to adapt to ‘the countless and variable schemes’ that 
are the hallmarks of the Howey test. 
 
126 See H.R. Rep. No. 73-85, at 1-2 (1933). 
 
127 Life Partners at 552, (Wald, J., dissenting).   
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 547.  (quoting Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982). 
 
130 See generally, Life Partners at 547.   
 
131 Howey at 299.  
 
132 Life Partners at 552, (Wald, J., dissenting).   
133 Glick at 984.  Glick takes the position that in the case of viatical 
settlements, Howey’s goal of “divining substance through form succeeds”  
because “substance must prevail over form, and viatical settlements are 
similar in form, but not substance, to securities. “ Id. Glick further 
argues that viatical settlements cannot be securities because they play no 
role in capital markets or formation.   
134 Edwards, 124 S. Ct. 892, 897 
 
135 Reves at 56.   
 
136 Glick at 974.  She argues that, in brokered viatical transactions, “the 
broker’s efforts fail Howey’s third prong because the broker’s efforts are 
not post-sale managerial or entrepreneurial….the broker facilitates the 
transfer of ownership rights from the policyholder to independent investors.  
The broker itself never acquires or retains ownership rights.  Instead, it 
simply matches a willing investor with a seller.  However, Glick posits her 
argument on the same faulty logic as Life Partners (even though her note was 
written before the D.C. Circuit’s opinion was issued), that is, that pre-
purchase efforts alone can never satisfy the third prong of Howey.  
 However, Glick’s own argument crumbles through her own explanation of 
the process of buying and selling viatical settlements, “[t]he potential 
investor is presented with a fixed purchase price predetermined by the 
broker.  Whereas the price may or may not be negotiable, the bulk of the 
calculations have been performed by the broker, thereby relieving the buyer 
of the responsibility of acquiring and mastering the specialized medical, 
actuarial, and financial information needed to assess a particular policy’s 
market value.” Id. This author’s question for Mz. Glick is, what happens when 
the promoter does not perform those services?  Are those servies not 
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analogous to a mutual fund manager’s decision of what stock to include in a 
given fund? 
 
137 Supra, note __ 
 
138 Wuliger at 903.    
 
139 Id. at 904.  
 
140 Tyler, 2002 WL 32538418.  
 
141 Wuliger at 904. (quoting Reves, at 56, 61.) “‘What truly determines 
viatical settlement profitability is the realization, over time, of an 
outcome predicted by the seller through its analysis of the viator’s life 
expectancy, the soundness of the insurer, the actions need to keep the policy 
in effect for the original face amount, and the insurer’s unconditional 
liability under the policy’s terns.’” Id. at 904 
 
142 Contra, Griffitts v. Life Partners, 2004 WL 1178418 (Tex. App. 2004) In 
Griffitts, a Texas appellate court followed the Life Partners reasoning and 
denied that viatical settlements were securities under the reasoning in Life 
Partners. Quite notably, the defendants in this case were the same promoters 
as in the SEC action seven years before in the D.C. Circuit.  The Texas court 
explained, 
 
Likewise, in the instant ca[]se [sic], the profitability of Griffitts’s 
interests in life insurance policies is not determined by any managerial 
efforts on the part of Life Partners.  Griffitts points to Life Partners 
efforts prior to her purchase, such as locating, researching, and evaluating 
the policies; and to the post-purchase efforts of the trust company that held 
and managed the policies, such as paying the policy premiums commission; 
however, Griffitts and Life Partners shared no common interest in the 
profitability of the policies. [sic]  And any ministerial post-purchase 
efforts on the part of Life Partners or the trust company could have no 
effect on the profitability of the policies, which was overwhelmingly 
determined by how long the insured lived.   
 
Id. at 2.   
 
143 818 N.E. 2d. 73  
 
144 Id. at 77. 
 
145 780 N. E. 2d 1191, 1197 (Ind. App. 2003) Poyer found that the pre-purchase 
efforts of the promoters were sufficient to satisfy Howey’s third prong.  
 
146 797 N.E. 2d 789, 797 (Ind. App. 2003)  
 
147 23 P. 3d 92,98. (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). Siporin directly disagreed with Life 
Partners because of its “inflexible and formalistic approach” to application 
of the securities laws”, and concluding that “[n]either Howey nor any federal 
securities decision lends anything more than tangential support for the 
bright-line rule set forth in Life Partners. The Howey test as evolved under 
Forman is more consistent with the view that pre-investment entrepreneurial 
or managerial activities may satisfy the third prong of the Howey test under 
appropriate circumstances.” Id. at 98.  
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148 Recently, many states have added the term “viatical settlements” to their 
definitions of a security in their Blue Sky laws. See, Alas Stat. 45.55.990;  
Cal. Corp. Code 25019; Ga. Code Ann. 10-5-2 (added 2001); Ind. Code 23-2-1-1;
Iowa Code 502.102; Me Rev. Stat. Ann., Title 32, 10501; Miss. Code Ann., 75-
71-105; Neb. Rev. Stat. 8-1102; NC Gen. Stat. 78A-2 (added 2002); ND Cent. 
Code 10-04-02; SD Codified Laws Ann. 47-31A-401; W. Va Code 32-4-401 (added 
2001).  In light of Life Partners, hopefully more states will add the term to 
the list of what falls under the subheading “investment contract”  
 
149 800 N.E. 2d 780.  
 
150 658 N.W. 2d 188. 
 
151 55 P. 3d 264. 
 
152 1337.   
 
153 298-299. 
 
154 Or the United States Supreme Court, if it is appealed that far (and if it 
grants certiorari). 
 
155 Mutual Benefits at 1342; Mutual Benefits, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23008 at 
42. Supra, fn. 58.   
 
156 Life Partners at 547, and 550 (Wald, J., dissenting)  See also: SEC v. 
Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc.  474 F. 2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 
157 “[a] fundamental purpose, common to [the securities laws], was to 
substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat 
emptor.” Life Partner at 550 (Wald, J., dissenting) (quoting LOUIS LOSS & JOEL 
SELIGMAN, 1 SECURITIES REGULATION 171-94, 391-94 (3d ed. 1989)(describing the 
disclosure philosophy of the securities laws).   
